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Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich Wins Appeal In Product
Disparagement Case San Diego, Ca, October 7, 1998- On September 29,
1998, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One, reversed a
libel verdict in excess of $1,500,000 in Melaleuca, Inc. v. Hulda
Regehr Clark, clarifying important constitutional protections in
product disparagement claims. Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich was
appellate counsel for Dr. Hulda R. Clark, the author of two books
which made reference to Melaleuca products, a company which sells a
line of personal hygiene, cosmetic, household cleaning,
over-the-counter pharmaceutical, nutrition and pet care
products.
Clark, an independent research scientist, developed
technology which she claims is capable of detecting the presence of
carcinogenic chemicals, such as benzene, in trace amounts in certain
products. In two books she has published, Clark stated that she had
found benzene in products containing melaleuca alternifolia oil,
including certain of Melaleuca's products.
In reversing the judgment, the Court of Appeal clarified
existing law that, even where a speaker has made false statements
which disparage the contents of a product, the owner or distributor
of the product is required to prove far more than publication of a
false statement in order to recover damages. Instead, the owner or
distributor must produce clear and convincing evidence that the
speaker acted with constitutional malice as required by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
A statement is made with constitutional malice when the
speaker either knows the statement is false or has some serious
subjective doubt about the truth of the statement. Because the trial
court erred in giving an instruction which permitted the jury to
find constitutional malice on an objective basis, the verdict
had to be overturned and the BAJI jury instruction on constitutional
malice invalidated.
BAJI 7.04.1 Invalidated - Using BAJI 7.04.1, the
trial court had instructed the jury in the Clark case that they
could find Clark spoke with constitutional malice if she "must have
had" serious doubts about the truth of her statements. The jury had
made an express finding that Clark did not know her statements were
false, but nonetheless published the statements in reckless
disregard of whether they were false and awarded punitive
damages.
As the law is clear that a finding of constitutional
malice is a subjective standard, objective recklessness or doubt can
not survive scrutiny, the Court of Appeal ruled. The Fourth District
noted the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly eschewed
liability based on what a speaker "must have realized." Thus,
because BAJI 7.04.1 allowed the jury to draw the inference as to
what Dr. Clark "must have believed," the verdict could not
stand.
In so ruling, the Court noted the record could support a
belief that Dr. Clark was as concerned and sincere about her
findings as any of history's scientific iconoclast. Accordingly, the
Court had little doubt that Clark would have obtained a more
favorable verdict had the jury been properly instructed.
In reversing the verdict, the Court underscored that where
allegedly false statements about the contents of a product are at
issue, the plaintiff must demonstrate the highest degree of
culpability: that the speaker had actual knowledge of falsity or
actual serious doubts as to the truth of his or her statements. The
Court reasoned that the public has a well-recognized interest in
knowing about the quality and content of consumer goods.
Because Clark's statements were made in the context of
books espousing her scientific theories and advocating the adoption
of what she believes are healthy nutritional practices and the
avoidance of a substance she believes cause serious illnesses, the
Court found her statements addressed matters of obvious wide spread
public interest.
Several other important rulings were made by the Court of
Appeal in the Clark decision. While noting the sparseness of
legal authority in the area of permitting expert testimony on the
issue of truth or falsity of speech, the Court held that a party
may, in appropriate circumstances, rely upon expert testimony to
establish the truth or falsity of statements made. Where an expert
is used, however, the expert must comply with the Kelly Rule.
Under Kelly, when an expert offers testimony which is based
upon the application of a new scientific technique, the party
offering the expert's testimony must demonstrate that the technique
is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in a
particular field in which it belongs.
"Obviously we are pleased with the courts decision and
with the speed with which the court delivered its decision" stated
Marcelle E. Mihaila, the Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich partner
and appellate expert who argued this case for Clark.
"This opinion clarifies the standard for imposing
liability in product disparagement cases," said Guylyn R. Cummins.
"This clarification is vital to allow discussion and debate of the
safety and effectiveness of products widely used by consumers
without unwarranted liability. This is the essence of the First
Amendment."
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